Docker has fixed CVE-2026-105445, a critical Docker Hub access-token flaw tied to personal-account-to-organization conversions. The issue did not expose every Docker Hub user. It affected a specific conversion workflow used between 26 August 2024 and 30 September 2026, where an existing personal access token could remain usable after control of the converted account changed. Docker says it found no evidence that the flaw was exploited.
Key takeaways
- Docker deployed a server-side fix on 30 September 2026, less than four hours after receiving the report.
- The risk applied to personal access tokens carried through an account-to-organization conversion—not ordinary Docker Hub logins.
- Docker notified potentially affected users by email on 2 October and deactivated transferred tokens on 8 October, except where an owner explicitly opted out.
- A valid inherited token could perform registry actions allowed by its scope, but it could not access the Docker Hub web interface, passwords, email settings or two-factor authentication.
- If you received no notification from Docker with the subject “Docker Hub Vulnerability Identified & Resolved,” Docker says you were not affected and no action is required.
What happened in CVE-2026-105445?
The vulnerability sat in Docker Hub’s account-conversion workflow. Docker lets a user convert a personal account into an organization. Before the fix, personal access tokens associated with that account could be reassigned to the organization’s new owner without the original token owner’s consent and without automatically rotating the secret.
That created an unusual ownership mismatch. A token secret known to the original owner could remain valid, while Docker Hub treated requests made with it as belonging to the new organization owner. The practical result depended on the token’s assigned permissions and on what repositories or organizations the new owner could access.
Security researcher Ron Masas, who named the issue “GhostPat,” reported it through Docker’s vulnerability-disclosure process. In an independent technical account, he says he reproduced the behavior and used the transferred token for authenticated registry operations. Docker’s own security advisory confirms the underlying token-reassignment flaw and its remediation timeline.
Who was affected?
This was not a blanket leak of Docker Hub credentials. The affected population was limited to accounts involved in the vulnerable conversion process during the exposure window. Docker identifies that period as 26 August 2024 at 20:33 UTC through 30 September 2026 at approximately 19:10 UTC.
| Question | Verified answer |
|---|---|
| Was every Docker Hub account affected? | No. The flaw concerned tokens involved in personal-account-to-organization conversions during the exposure window. |
| Did Docker notify affected users? | Docker says potentially affected users received an email on 2 October 2026. |
| Was a Docker password exposed? | No evidence indicates exposure of passwords, email settings or two-factor authentication. |
| Did Docker find exploitation? | No. Docker says its review found no evidence of malicious exploitation, while noting that an unused token may leave no registry activity to review. |
| Is the vulnerable workflow still active? | No. Docker says the server-side fix was deployed on 30 September 2026. |
The simplest practical test is the notification. If Docker emailed you about this CVE, review the affected conversion and credentials immediately. If no such email arrived, Docker’s guidance is that your account was not affected and you do not need to take CVE-specific action.
What could an inherited token do?
A transferred token could authenticate to Docker Hub’s registry services as the new owner, within the permissions available to that credential. Depending on scope and repository access, that could allow pulling private images or pushing and deleting image content. Those are high-impact actions because container registries frequently sit inside software build and deployment pipelines.
The token did not provide a normal browser session. Docker says it could not be used to sign in to the Docker Hub web interface, change the account password or email address, alter two-factor authentication, or create new access tokens. That distinction matters: CVE-2026-105445 was a registry-authorization problem, not a full interactive account takeover.
The researcher’s write-up discusses possible supply-chain consequences if a privileged token were abused. Those are credible risk scenarios, not confirmed incidents. Docker reports reviewing roughly 304,000 image pushes made with transferred tokens and finding no evidence of exploitation or malicious content in the higher-risk public images it examined.
How did Docker respond?
Docker says it received the report on 30 September and deployed a fix in under four hours. The company then audited conversions performed during the full exposure period, notified potentially affected users on 2 October, and forcibly deactivated transferred tokens on 8 October unless the current owner explicitly opted out.
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 26 August 2024 | Docker identifies the start of the affected conversion period. |
| 30 September 2026 | The researcher reports the issue; Docker deploys the server-side fix the same day. |
| 2 October 2026 | Docker emails users associated with potentially affected conversions. |
| 8 October 2026 | Docker deactivates transferred tokens, apart from explicit opt-outs. |
| 12 October 2026 | Docker publishes its public advisory for CVE-2026-105445. |
Docker has also changed the workflow going forward. Its current account-conversion documentation states that existing personal access tokens stop working after conversion.
What should Docker Hub users do now?
Start with evidence rather than rotating every credential blindly. Search the email address tied to Docker Hub for the 2 October notification. Organization owners should also inventory recent account conversions, active tokens, repository collaborators and unexpected registry activity.
- Check whether Docker contacted you. The advisory gives the notification subject as “Docker Hub Vulnerability Identified & Resolved.”
- Revoke any legacy or unexplained token. Do this even if Docker already deactivated the transferred credential, because the review may reveal other stale tokens.
- Review repository activity. Examine pushes, deletions, tags and image digests around the relevant conversion date and afterward.
- Rebuild high-risk images when integrity is uncertain. Use trusted source and dependencies, then compare and redeploy immutable digests.
- Update CI/CD secrets. Replace revoked credentials in build systems and confirm the new secret has only the permissions the workflow requires.
- Document account ownership. Before any future conversion, identify which personal credentials and automated jobs depend on the account.
If you maintain Docker on developer workstations, the credential model is separate from updating Docker Desktop itself. Our Docker Desktop 4.94 update overview covers current client-side security and reliability fixes, while this CVE concerns Docker Hub’s hosted authorization workflow.
How should organizations secure Docker automation?
Personal access tokens are associated with an individual Docker account. Docker’s PAT documentation recommends creating scoped tokens and periodically reviewing them. For organization-owned automation, Docker provides Organization Access Tokens for Team and Business subscriptions.
| Credential | Best fit | Main control |
|---|---|---|
| Personal Access Token | Developer-owned command-line or limited personal automation | Scope it narrowly and rotate it when responsibilities change. |
| Organization Access Token | Organization-owned CI/CD and service automation | Keep ownership with the organization rather than one employee. |
| OIDC-based workflow | Supported short-lived CI authentication, including documented GitHub Actions scenarios | Avoid storing a long-lived Docker secret where the integration supports federation. |
Whichever mechanism you choose, avoid broad read-write-delete access when a job only needs to pull an image. If you are building and publishing containers, our guides to building a Docker image on Linux and pushing an image to Docker Hub show where registry credentials enter the workflow.
Our assessment
Docker’s rapid server-side fix substantially reduces the immediate risk, and the targeted deactivation of transferred tokens closes the vulnerable path for the known population. The most important remaining work is organizational hygiene: verify who owns automation credentials, remove dormant tokens and make registry activity reviewable.
The episode also shows why identity transitions deserve the same security scrutiny as login flows. A secret can remain cryptographically valid while its intended owner and authorization context silently change. Preventing that class of problem requires revoking or explicitly reissuing credentials whenever account ownership changes—not merely moving database records to a new owner.
Frequently asked questions
Is CVE-2026-105445 still exploitable?
Docker says it fixed the vulnerable conversion workflow on 30 September 2026 and later deactivated affected transferred tokens, except for explicit opt-outs. Users who received Docker’s notification should still complete the recommended credential and activity review.
Do all Docker Hub users need to reset their passwords?
No. Docker describes this as an access-token flaw, not a password leak. Its advisory says users who did not receive the notification were not affected and need take no action for this incident.
Could the flaw expose private container images?
A valid transferred token could pull private images that the impersonated account was permitted to access. The exact impact depended on token scope and repository or organization permissions.
Should I replace PATs with Organization Access Tokens?
For organization-owned automation, an Organization Access Token can avoid tying a critical workflow to one person’s account, subject to Docker subscription availability. Personal access tokens remain suitable for individual use when narrowly scoped and regularly reviewed.
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